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BRIEF OF THE STATES OF OREGON, CALIFORNIA, IOWA,
DELAWARE, NEW YORK, MARYLAND, CONNECTICUT,
HAWAII, AND VERMONT, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
_______________
INTERESTS OF THE AMICI
Amici,1 Oregon, California, Iowa, Delaware, New York, Maryland,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Vermont, and the District of Columbia,2 have a vested
interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens; an
interest that is advanced through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 20103 (“ACA”). Moreover, Amici have a vital interest in ensuring
that constitutional principles of federalism are respected by the federal
government, as they are here.
As part of their responsibility to help provide access to affordable care
for their citizens, Amici have engaged in varied, creative, and determined
state-by-state efforts to expand and improve health insurance coverage in
their states and to contain healthcare costs. Despite some successes, these
state-by-state efforts mostly have fallen short due in part to the strongly
1

Amici file this brief pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure

29(a).
2

Although Massachusetts has filed a brief detailing its unique
experience with its health care reform, it agrees with the arguments set forth
in this brief.
3
The ACA refers to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–148, and the Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–152.
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2
interstate nature of the healthcare market which limits effective intrastate
regulation.
California’s dire situation illustrates the problems facing Amici. In
2009, more than 7.2 million Californians—nearly one in four people under
the age of 65—lacked insurance for all or part of the year.4 More than 5.5
million Californians who could not afford private insurance were enrolled in
government-sponsored health plans, which will cost the State a projected
$42 billion in the next fiscal year.5 Of those funds, $27.1 billion comes from
the General Fund, which faces a $25 billion deficit.
Other states are also grappling with the spiraling cost of medical care
and health insurance. For example, despite a variety of legislative efforts to
increase access to insurance coverage, 21.8% of Oregonians lack health
insurance and The Urban Institute has predicted that without comprehensive

4

UCLA Center for Health Policy Research, Two-Thirds of
California’s Seven Million Uninsured May Obtain Coverage Under Health
Care Reform (Feb. 2011) at 2, available at:
http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/twothirdspb-2-16-2011.pdf (last
visited April 1, 2011).
5

2011–2012 Governor’s Budget Summary at 95–96 (Jan. 10, 2011),
available at: http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudget
Summary.pdf (last visited April 1, 2011).
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3
healthcare reform, that figure will rise to 27.4% by 2019.6 In 2009, Oregon
spent $2.6 billion on Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance
Program. Without comprehensive healthcare reform, the cost is expected to
double to $5.5 billion by 2019.7
Maryland’s struggle also provides a useful example. Despite the
State’s expansion of its Medicaid program and the introduction of the
Maryland Health Insurance Plan (MHIP), 16.1% of Marylanders still lack
health insurance.8 In the face of an unexpectedly high demand for coverage
and the high cost of claims, MHIP was forced, between 2006 to 2010, to
increase premiums by about 40%, to institute a $100,000 lifetime cap on
pharmacy benefits, and, notwithstanding the Plan’s objective to provide
insurance for otherwise uninsurable individuals, to begin excluding benefit
claims for preexisting conditions during the first six months of an

6

Bowen Garrett et al., The Cost of Failure to Enact Health Reform:
Implications for States, 51 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Urban
Institute Oct. 1, 2009), available at:
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411965_failure_to_enact.pdf (last visited
April 1, 2011).
7

Id.

8

Id.
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4
individual’s enrollment in the Plan. Moreover, in 2009, the State’s hospitals
provided $999 million in uncompensated care to those without insurance.9
The economic situation that states now face is unsustainable. Without
comprehensive and coordinated healthcare reform, state-level healthcare
costs will rise dramatically over the next 10 years. Even as states are forced
to spend more and more to keep up with skyrocketing healthcare costs, the
number of individuals without insurance will continue to rise. As a
consequence, comprehensive national healthcare reform is urgently needed.
While recognizing the pressing need for national reforms to address
the healthcare crisis, Amici also have a keen interest in reforms that will
maintain the balance of power between the states and national government.
Amici have long been leaders and innovators in the healthcare policy arena,
and intend to continue in that role. As states that remain committed to
finding innovative ways to improve our citizens’ healthcare, Amici have a
special interest in reforms that respect the principles of cooperative
federalism and that will allow states to maintain a central role in shaping
healthcare policy within their borders.

9

Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission, ANNUAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 4 (2010), available at:
http://www.hscrc.state.md.us/documents/HSCRC_PolicyDocumentsReports/
AnnualReports/GovReport10_MD_HSCRC.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
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5
The ACA is a comprehensive national solution that embraces the
principle of cooperative federalism and that will help Amici fulfill their duty
to protect and promote the health and welfare of their citizens. It strikes an
appropriate, and constitutional, balance between national requirements that
will expand access to affordable healthcare while providing states flexibility
to design programs that achieve that goal. Amici urge this Court to reverse
the decision of the district court and uphold this important law.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court erred in holding that Congress
exceeded the scope of its authority under the Commerce
Clause when it enacted the ACA’s minimum coverage
provision.

2.

Whether the district court erred in holding that Congress
exceeded the scope of its authority under the Necessary and
Proper Clause when it enacted the ACA’s minimum coverage
provision.

3.

Whether the district court erred in holding that the minimum
coverage provision is not severable from the rest of the ACA.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The minimum coverage provision fits easily within Congress’s

Commerce Clause authority as articulated by the Supreme Court. In
reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court erroneously reasoned that
the provision was unlawful because it regulates “inactivity.” But the
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6
Supreme Court has never relied on a distinction between “activity” and
“inactivity” in examining the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
authority, much less suggested that the distinction is in any way relevant for
purposes of the Commerce Clause. Nor is there a sound reason for injecting
that dubious dichotomy into the analysis here. Whether choosing to forgo
health insurance should be characterized as an “activity” or “inactivity” is a
fruitless semantic inquiry with no correct answer and thus no analytical
content. Attempting to draw a line between laws that regulate “activity” and
laws that regulate “inactivity” does not provide a workable framework for
Commerce Clause analysis.
Under the established framework articulated by the Supreme Court, the
minimum coverage provision is a justifiable exercise of Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority for either of two reasons. First, in the
aggregate, individual decisions to maintain a minimum level of insurance
coverage substantially affect interstate commerce by pooling risk, lowering
healthcare costs, and reducing uncompensated care for everyone.
Conversely, in the aggregate, individual decisions to forgo coverage raise
the cost of healthcare and shift the cost of providing uncompensated care to
the states and those who pay for coverage. Second, and in any case, the

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 04/11/2011

Page: 16 of 46

7
minimum coverage provision is constitutional because it is essential to
Congress’s regulation of the national healthcare market.
The minimum coverage provision is also justified by the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Not only is the minimum coverage provision necessary to
carry out Congress’s goals of lowering the costs of medical care and
expanding insurance coverage, it is a proper exercise of federal authority
that does not alter the essential attributes of state sovereignty. The ACA
continues a longstanding and necessary partnership between the states and
the federal government in the healthcare policy arena.
After erroneously concluding that the minimum coverage provision is
unconstitutional, the district court compounded the error by concluding that
the provision is not severable from the remainder of the ACA and striking
down the entire law. The ACA contains hundreds of healthcare reform
provisions, the overwhelming majority of which are completely independent
of the minimum coverage provision. As the States’ experience
implementing the ACA already demonstrates, those provisions are entirely
capable of being applied independent of the minimum coverage provision,
which has not yet gone into effect. The district court’s decision to nullify
every provision in the ACA is without justification.

Case: 11-11021
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8
STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The ACA is a comprehensive reform law that supplies hundreds of
tools for the states, in partnership with the federal government, to expand
access to affordable and reliable healthcare. The ACA relies in large part on
an expansion of the current market for health insurance, building upon
existing state and federal partnerships to improve access to healthcare.
Collectively, these reforms will result in broader healthcare coverage,
reductions in state spending for uncompensated care, and improved quality
of care.
The law anticipates that the majority of the population will be covered
through their employer or through expanded access to government-run plans
such as Medicaid. While the ACA requires businesses with more than fifty
employees to begin providing health insurance in 2014, ACA § 1513, small
businesses have already started taking advantage of the ACA’s significant
tax breaks, including some of the thousands of businesses eligible in the
Eleventh Circuit. ACA § 1421.10 The ACA also expands access to
Medicaid to individuals who earn less than 133 percent of the federal
poverty level, and funds 100 percent of the cost until 2017. ACA § 2001(a).

10

http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/count_per_state_for_
special_post_card_notice.pdf (last visited April 8, 2011).
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9
For those individuals who do not obtain health insurance from their
employer or from government-run plans, the ACA makes affordable
coverage more readily available. It eliminates annual and lifetime caps on
health insurance benefits so that individuals can maintain coverage during a
catastrophic illness. ACA § 10101(a). The ACA also authorizes states to
create health insurance exchanges that will allow individuals and small
businesses to pool together so that they have the purchasing power of larger
corporations. ACA § 1311.
The ACA also makes it easier to obtain health insurance by prohibiting
insurance companies from refusing to cover individuals with preexisting
conditions starting in 2014. ACA § 1201. A significant number of people
who are uninsured are currently unable to purchase insurance or are required
to pay much higher premiums due to a preexisting condition, which can
include common illnesses such as heart disease, cancer, asthma, or even
pregnancy.11 The ACA thus dramatically increases the availability of
insurance for previously uninsurable individuals.
The ACA reforms will allow states to substantially expand and
improve healthcare coverage. Oregon, for example, estimates that the ACA
11

Karen Pollitz, Richard Sorian, and Kathy Thomas, How Accessible
is Individual Health Insurance for Consumers in Less-Than-Perfect Health?
(Report to the Kaiser Family Foundation, June 2001).
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10
will allow the State to reduce the number of uninsured to just 5% by 2019—
a vast improvement over the 27.4% the State forecasts will be uninsured by
that time without the reforms.12
The only provision of the ACA that the district court concluded was
constitutionally infirm is the minimum coverage provision, which requires
most residents of the United States, starting in 2014, to obtain health
insurance or pay a tax. ACA § 1501. Residents whose income falls below
a specified level or who can demonstrate that purchasing insurance would
pose a hardship are exempt from the penalty for failing to obtain health
insurance. ACA § 1501(e). In effect, the minimum coverage provision is
targeted at those who, while they can afford it, choose not to purchase
insurance and choose instead to “self insure,” relying on luck, their own
financial reserves, and the healthcare social safety net of emergency rooms
and public insurance programs to catch them when they fall ill.
ARGUMENT
I.

Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to enact
the ACA’s minimum coverage provision.
The Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s power under the

Commerce Clause includes the authority to regulate economic activities that,

12

Bowen Garrett et al., supra note 5.
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11
in the aggregate, have a “substantial effect on interstate commerce.”
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). In addition, Congress may
regulate local, noneconomic activity provided such regulation is “an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). As explained
below, the minimum coverage provision is a justifiable exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power under both formulations.
A.

In articulating Congress’s regulatory power, the
Supreme Court has never distinguished between
“activity” and “inactivity,” nor does that distinction provide
a workable framework for analysis.

In striking down the ACA, the district court concluded that the
minimum coverage provision was an unlawful and unprecedented attempt by
Congress to regulate “inactivity.” According to the district court, “it would
be a radical departure from existing case law to hold that Congress can
regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 42.)13

13

The district court made much of the argument that “[n]ever before
has Congress required that everyone buy a product from a private company .
. .” and the “assumed absence of such power.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 38-39). That
assumption is contradicted by The Militia Act of 1792, which the 2nd
Congress enacted shortly after the Bill of Rights was ratified. That law
required “every free able-bodied white male citizen” between 18 and 45 to
“provide himself with a good musket or flintlock, a sufficient bayonet and
belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch, with a box therein, to contain

Case: 11-11021

Date Filed: 04/11/2011

Page: 21 of 46

12
The distinction between “activity” and “inactivity,” however, has no basis in
Supreme Court jurisprudence and is, in fact, illusory.
None of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause cases have addressed
the question of whether the regulated conduct was properly characterized as
“activity” or “inactivity,” much less suggested that such a distinction is in
any way relevant or useful to the analysis. The Supreme Court’s Commerce
Clause decisions, including Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942),
Lopez, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000), and Raich, have
referred to Congress’s power to regulate “economic activity.” The district
court concluded from the Supreme Court’s use of that term that Congress
can only regulate activity, not inactivity. But that reasoning is fallacious,
and it elevates descriptive statements into a holding. The Supreme Court’s
discussions of “economic activity” have been focused on whether the
conduct at issue was in fact economic, not on whether it was properly
characterized as “activity.”
Distinguishing “activity” from “inactivity” is inherently problematic.
In fact, many regulations can be characterized as regulating both “activity”

not less than twenty-four cartridges” at his own expense. The Militia Act
dramatically illustrates that the “original understanding” afforded the federal
government power to compel individuals to make a substantial purchase
when appropriate for the common good.
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13
and “inactivity,” illustrating the false distinction between the two. For
instance, the failure to comply with draft registration requirements can be
viewed as inaction or as an affirmative act of disobedience. See 50 U.S.C.
App. 451 et seq. So too can the failure to appear for federal jury duty as
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1854(b) be seen either as an affirmative action of
evading jury service or as no action at all. Such examples belie the district
court’s contention that regulation of “inactivity” is “unprecedented.” To the
contrary, it is commonplace.
Remarking on the inherent difficulty in distinguishing “activity” from
“inactivity,” Justice Scalia has observed that “[e]ven as a legislative
matter…the intelligent line does not fall between action and inaction.”
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). The same could be said here. While it may
be semantically possible to characterize the decision not to purchase health
insurance as “inactivity,” as the district court did, it is at the very least
equally reasonable to characterize that decision as “activity.” Indeed, at
least three other federal courts considering the issue have already concluded
that such a decision is properly characterized as economic “activity.” As
Judge Kessler of the United States District Court for the District of
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14
Columbia recently wrote in granting the government’s motion to dismiss a
claim similar to that before this Court:
It is pure semantics to argue that an individual who
makes a choice to forego health insurance is not
“acting,” especially given the serious economic and
health-related consequences to every individual of that
choice. Making a choice is an affirmative action,
whether one decides to do something or not do
something. To pretend otherwise is to ignore reality.
Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL 61139, *18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011). See also,
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, at *3-8 (W.D. Va. Nov.
30, 2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F.Supp.2d 882, 887-90
(E.D. Mich. 2010).
The inability of the lower courts to agree on whether the minimum
coverage provision regulates “activity” or “inactivity” reflects the inherent
problem with that line of inquiry. Asking whether an individual’s decision
to forgo health insurance is “action” or “inaction” is a fruitless query, the
answer to which depends entirely on how one frames the question. For that
reason, attempting to draw a line between laws that regulate “activity” and
laws that regulate “inactivity” does not provide a workable framework for
Commerce Clause analysis. The proper question is not whether the decision
to refuse to purchase health insurance is best characterized as “action” or
“inaction,” but rather whether such decisions, in the aggregate, substantially
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affect interstate commerce. If they do, Supreme Court precedent recognizes
Congress’s authority to regulate them. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59.
B.

The minimum coverage provision is constitutional because
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that choosing
to forgo health insurance substantially affects interstate
commerce.

In U.S. v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006), this Court
recognized that “Raich grants Congress substantial leeway to regulate purely
intrastate activity (whether economic or not) that it deems to have the
capability, in the aggregate, of frustrating the broader regulation of interstate
economic activity.” Id. at 1215. In determining whether a regulated activity
substantially affects interstate commerce within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause, the Court “need not determine whether . . . [the
regulated] activities, taken in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational basis’ exists for so
concluding. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added).
Here Congress specifically found that the minimum coverage
provision regulates activity that is “commercial and economic in nature” and
that it “substantially affects interstate commerce.” ACA § 1501(a)(1).
Moreover, Congress certainly had a rational basis for reaching that
conclusion.
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An individual’s decision to purchase or not purchase health insurance
is a decision that, when taken together with the decisions of all individuals
similarly situated, substantially affects the market for health insurance and
the market for healthcare. In concluding otherwise, the district court
mistakenly reasoned that “the mere status of being without health insurance,
in and of itself, has absolutely no impact whatsoever on interstate
commerce.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 50). Such reasoning fails to grasp the complex
reality of the health insurance and healthcare markets, where the aggregated
purchasing decisions of individuals who choose not to maintain health
insurance have a direct and powerful impact on those markets.
Insurance is a system of shared risk. But in a system where
purchasing insurance is purely voluntary, people with higher than average
health risks will disproportionately enroll in insurance plans, as an individual
is more likely to purchase insurance when he or she expects to require
healthcare services. Conversely, those with lower than average risks,
especially young Americans, are less likely to purchase insurance.14 This
phenomenon is commonly referred to as “adverse selection.”
14

In California, for instance, 18 to 34 year-olds represent 43 percent
of the state’s uninsured. California HealthCare Foundation, California’s
Uninsured at 18 (Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.chcf.org/publications/2010/12/californias-uninsured (last visited
April 1, 2011).
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Adverse selection raises the cost of insurance premiums in two ways.
First, it raises the overall cost because adverse selection tends to create
insurance pools with higher than average risks and premiums reflect the
average cost of providing care for the members of the pool. Second, because
insurers fear the potentially substantial costs associated with the
disproportionate enrollment of people with non-obvious high health risks,
they will often add an extra fee to their premiums, particularly in the small
group and individual markets. The minimum coverage provision addresses
both of these factors, first by driving low-risk people into the risk pool, thus
driving down average insurance costs, and second by lessening the
probability that a given individual is purchasing insurance solely because he
or she knows something the insurer does not know about his or her health
status, thereby reducing insurer hedging and the fees associated with adverse
selection.
In addition to reducing the cost of health insurance by addressing the
problem of adverse selection, the minimum coverage provision also
addresses the problem of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured.
When individuals choose not to purchase health insurance, they are still
participants in the interstate healthcare marketplace: when they get sick, they
seek medical attention. The cost of providing this uncompensated care to
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the uninsured is staggering: over $40 billion annually, as Congress found in
enacting the ACA. ACA § 1501(a)(2)(F), 1016(a). Only one-third of the
cost of that care is covered by the uninsured themselves. The remaining
two-thirds of the cost are passed on to other public and private actors in the
interstate healthcare and health insurance system, and ultimately are passed
on to those with health insurance through higher premiums. In California,
for instance, in 2006, the average family with health insurance paid an
additional $1,186 in premiums to cover the cost of uncompensated care for
the uninsured.15
In Maryland, the State’s Health Services Cost Review Commission, a
hospital rate-setting body, authorizes the State’s hospitals to impose a fee on
all patients to reimburse hospitals for the costs associated with providing
care to the uninsured. In 2009, when Maryland hospitals provided a total of
$999 million in uncompensated care, 6.91% of the charge for any visit to a
Maryland hospital reflected a Commission-approved add-on charge to
reimburse the hospital for the cost of providing uncompensated care. In
other words, a fixed and substantial portion of every Maryland hospitalpatient’s bill reflects the shifting of costs from supposedly “inactive”

15

Peter Harbage and Len M. Nichols, Ph.D., A Premium Price: The
Hidden Costs All Californians Pay in Our Fragmented Health Care System
(New America Foundation, Dec. 2006).
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individuals to the patient population as a whole. Requiring individuals to
possess health insurance ends this cost-shifting, lowering the costs of
healthcare for everyone and reducing the costs to the States of providing
such care.
Massachusetts’ experience with healthcare reform demonstrates that a
minimum coverage requirement, when combined with a comprehensive
reform program, can spread risk, control costs and reduce the financial
burdens otherwise borne by health plans and state and federal government
programs. As Massachusetts has explained in its amicus brief, it has
implemented reforms that require all non-exempt individuals to purchase
some form of health insurance coverage. Those reforms have dramatically
reduced the number of uninsured, giving Massachusetts the lowest rate of
uninsured residents in the nation.16 As a result, the state experienced a sharp
decline in the amount of state spending on healthcare for the uninsured and
under-insured.
In summary, Congress had a rational basis for concluding that, in the
aggregate, economic decisions regarding how to pay for healthcare

16

See Mass. Taxpayers Found., Massachusetts Health Reform: The
Myth of Uncontrolled Costs at 2 (May 2009), available at
http://www.masstaxpayers.org/sites/masstaxpayers.org/files/health%carent.pdf (last visited April 1, 2011).
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services—including, in particular, decisions to forgo coverage and to pay
later or, if need be, to depend on free care—have a substantial effect on the
interstate healthcare and health insurance markets. The Commerce Clause
empowers Congress to regulate these direct and aggregate market effects.
See Raich, 545 U.S. at 16–17; Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–28.
C.

The minimum coverage provision is constitutional because
it is an essential part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.

The minimum coverage provision is also constitutional because it is
“an essential part of a larger regulation” of the health care industry. Among
the purposes of the ACA is the creation of a comprehensive regulatory
scheme that will rein in the cost of healthcare coverage, reduce the number
of people who lack coverage, and prevent insurance providers from denying
coverage to people with preexisting conditions. The minimum coverage
provision is an essential part of that scheme. Indeed, Congress expressly
found that the minimum coverage provision was “essential to creating
effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of
preexisting conditions can be sold.” ACA § 1501(a)(1). Congress’s
judgment in that regard—which is entitled to “a strong presumption of
validity,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 28—is plainly justified.
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It is beyond dispute that Congress has the power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate the provision of health insurance, as it has done for
decades. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533
(1944); see also Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.); Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) (29 U.S.C. § 1161 et seq.); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (42 U.S.C. §
1320d et seq.). Congress found that spending for health insurance was over
$850 billion in 2009. ACA. § 1501(a)(2)(B). Nor can it be doubted that
Congress has the constitutional authority to regulate the healthcare industry.
Seventeen percent of the United States economy is devoted to healthcare.
ACA § 1501(a)(2)(B). As Congress recognized, medical supplies, drugs,
and equipment used in the provision of healthcare routinely cross state lines.
Id. And of course, the federal government has for decades been deeply
involved in healthcare regulation, including programs such as Medicare,
Medicaid, and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.
The minimum coverage provision is an important part of Congress’s
effort to create a regulatory scheme that will allow for affordable, accessible,
and robust insurance markets on which all Americans can rely. For
example, the ACA prohibits insurers from denying coverage to those with
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preexisting conditions. ACA § 2704. But successful implementation of
that provision will require incorporating healthy people into the risk pool.
The reality is that “[i]nsurance pools cannot be stable over time, nor can
insurers remain financially viable, if people enroll only when their costs are
expected to be high. . .[a]nd research leaves no doubt that without an
individual mandate, many people will remain uninsured” until they get
sick.17 By requiring everyone to pay into the risk pool, the ACA will
dramatically reduce adverse selection and make it practical to insist upon
coverage for individuals with pre-existing conditions. If pre-existing
condition exclusions are eliminated with no requirement that one purchase
insurance, people would have an incentive to forgo coverage until they get
sick and as a consequence the high-risk pool would collapse from inadequate
funding.18
The minimum coverage provision is also an essential component of
Congress’s plan to address the skyrocketing costs of uncompensated care.
By requiring individuals to maintain a minimum level of health insurance,
17

Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, The Individual Mandate—An
Affordable and Fair Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 New
Eng. J. Med. 6, 6–7 (2009).
18

See Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutionality of Health Insurance
Reform, Part II: Congressional Power (Nov. 2, 2009), available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20091102.html (last visited Jan. 11,
2011).
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these costs will be reduced, lowering the burden on states and individuals
who are forced to subsidize the care of the uninsured while at the same time
alleviating the problem of uninsured individuals using scarce emergency
room resources.
As this Court noted in Maxwell, “what distinguished Raich from
Morrison and Lopez , . . .was the comprehensiveness of the economic
component of the regulation.” 446 F.3d at 1214. Similarly, because the
minimum coverage provision is an integral part of the ACA’s
“comprehensive framework for regulating” healthcare, the absence of which
would severely undercut Congress’s regulatory scheme, it is therefore
constitutional. Raich, 545 U.S. at 3.
II.

Congress Also Has the Authority Under the Necessary and Proper
Clause to Enact the ACA’s Minimum Coverage Provision.
A.

The minimum coverage provision is a necessary means to a
legitimate end.

Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause is augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, which allows Congress to “make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution” the powers
enumerated in the Constitution. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8. As Justice Scalia,
who was in the majority in Lopez and Morrison, has explained, the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to “regulate even those
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intrastate activities that do not substantially affect interstate commerce” as
well as “noneconomic local activity” where necessary to make a regulation
of interstate commerce effective. Raich, 545 U.S. at 35, 37 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The minimum coverage provision is necessary to lower the
cost of health insurance and to effectuate the ban on denials of coverage
based on preexisting conditions. It is therefore within Congress’s power to
enact.
In rejecting application of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the district
court repeatedly emphasized that the Clause is “not an independent source of
power” and reasoned that the Clause “cannot be utilized to ‘pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects’ that are not within the Congress’s enumerated
powers.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 62). While those statements of the law are
certainly true, they are also irrelevant here because the minimum coverage
provision does not accomplish an objective “outside Congress’s enumerated
powers.” Rather, it is a legitimate and necessary means to accomplish an
objective—regulation of the nation’s $2.5 trillion national healthcare
market—that is squarely within the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power.
Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress’s authority includes
all means which are appropriate and are properly adapted to legitimate ends.
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McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). Thus, the correct
inquiry is whether “the means chosen are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the
attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power.” United States v.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1957 (2010). In making this determination,
courts must give Congress “large discretion as to the means that may be
employed in executing a given power.” Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321,
355 (1903).
In this case, Congress’s goal is clearly legitimate: to reduce the expense
of healthcare, which consumes over a trillion dollars of the nation’s
economy, and expand access to health insurance as the federal government
has been doing since the passage of the Social Security Act in 1965. So too
are the means reasonably adapted. As explained above, the minimum
coverage provision ameliorates the problem of adverse selection by
expanding the insurance pool which will also result in reduced insurance
premiums and lower costs of healthcare. Accordingly, the minimum
coverage provision is reasonably adapted, indeed necessary, for several
portions of the ACA to function properly.
B.

The minimum coverage provision is also a “proper”
exercise of congressional authority that does not encroach
on state sovereignty.
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In addition to being necessary, the minimum coverage provision is also
proper. In holding to the contrary, the district court concluded that the
minimum coverage provision was inconsistent with the principles of
federalism and that allowing such a provision would “effectively remove all
limits on federal power.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 62). Amici obviously share the
district court’s concern with preserving state sovereignty and adhering to the
principles of federalism, but we cannot agree that those principles are
violated here. In fact, the ACA continues a longstanding and necessary
partnership in the healthcare policy arena. The district court’s conclusion
that the ACA removes all limits on federal power dramatically overstates the
authority being claimed by the federal government, and dramatically
understates the extent to which the federal government already regulates a
significant portion of the health insurance market.
In Comstock, the Supreme Court explained that the “powers ‘delegated
to the United States by the Constitution’ include those specifically
enumerated powers listed in Article I along with the implementation
authority granted by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Comstock, 130 S. Ct.
at 1962. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy described one consideration in
determining the extent of Congress’s power: “whether essential attributes of
state sovereignty are compromised by the assertion of federal power under
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the Necessary and Proper Clause” Id. at 1967–68. In the present case,
neither the minimum coverage provision, nor indeed the ACA as a whole,
may be said to “compromise” state sovereignty.
The regulation of healthcare and health insurance is not, and never has
been, principally a matter for the states. Healthcare is extremely costly and
states’ ability to raise revenue is far more limited than the federal
government’s. Virtually all states are unable to run budget deficits,19 and
thus their budgets are often highly variable from year to year, making stable
funding for healthcare programs elusive. The healthcare payment and
delivery systems are shaped in large part by federal revenue streams, tax
policy, and federal statutes, constraining states’ ability to engage in truly
systematic reform on a state-by-state basis. States also lack the economies
of scale that can be achieved on the national level. Furthermore, state-bystate regulation is constrained by the knowledge that businesses and health
insurance companies are free to flee to more hospitable states should one
state implement stronger protections than its neighbor states.

19

The only exception is Vermont. National Conference of State
Legislatures, State Balanced Budget Provisions, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions2010.
pdf (last visited March 28, 2011).
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For all of these reasons, the states and the federal government have
been working together to implement healthcare policy for at least the last
half-century. The federal government, for example, has provided funding to
the states to enable medical insurance and care for the poor under Medicaid,
and for low-income children under CHIP. Millions more Americans are
covered through federal insurance programs, the military, and the Veterans
Administration. The federal government has designed, funded, and
administered the Medicare program, which provides health insurance for
96% of the nation’s elderly citizens.

COBRA , HIPPA, and ERISA set

numerous federal requirements for health insurance. The federal
government has long been enmeshed in the healthcare and health insurance
arenas, frequently working in partnership with the states. For all of the
controversy surrounding the ACA, it is not fundamentally different from
other cooperative federal-state programs that have been in existence for
decades.
The ACA continues the tradition of cooperation between the states and
the federal government in a way that respects our system of dual sovereignty
and that will allow states to continue to innovate. Among dozens of
provisions allowing states flexibility, the law will continue to allow states to
take advantage of Medicaid waiver programs and federal funds to expand
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access to health insurance and test different approaches to providing care.
ACA § 1332. In addition, the ACA provides interested states federal
funding and broad latitude to establish exchanges that best meet the needs of
their respective citizens, subject to minimum federal standards. ACA §
1311. Similarly, the ACA allows states great latitude in establishing basic
health programs for low-income individuals not eligible for Medicaid.
Because of the ACA’s inherent flexibility, states may choose to enact
further reforms to improve upon the federal reforms contained in the ACA.
Indeed, the ACA specifically gives states authority to pass additional
regulations pertaining to insurance companies. Pursuant to the authority to
oversee any increases in the premiums set by insurance companies,
California recently passed a law requiring all premium filings to be reviewed
and certified by an independent actuary to ensure premium costs are
accurately calculated. Cal. Stats. 2010, Ch. 661. These consumer
protections exceed what federal law requires under the ACA. Finally,
nothing in the ACA usurps the states’ traditional role in regulating the
standards for medical care.
When the Social Security Act was enacted in 1935 it, like the ACA,
was challenged as an incursion on states’ prerogatives. The Supreme
Court’s rejection of that argument is squarely on point and bears repeating:
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The problem is plainly national in area and dimensions.
Moreover, laws of the separate states cannot deal with it
effectively. Congress, at least, had a basis for that
belief. States and local governments are often lacking in
the resources that are necessary to finance an adequate
program of security for the aged. . . . Apart from the
failure of resources, states and local governments are at
times reluctant to increase so heavily the burden of
taxation to be borne by their residents for fear of placing
themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as
compared with neighbors or competitors. . . . A system
of old age pensions has special dangers of its own, if put
in force in one state and rejected in another. The
existence of such a system is a bait to the needy and
dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and
seek a haven of repose. Only a power that is national
can serve the interests of all.
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937). Precisely the same thing
could be said of the healthcare crisis currently gripping the states and the
nation.
As states, Amici are fiercely protective of their sovereignty, and have a
vital role in ensuring that the balance of power between the states and
federal governments reflected in the Constitution is rigidly maintained. The
ACA does nothing to disturb that balance. Rather, it provides states with the
necessary tools to ensure that their citizens have access to affordable medical
care in a healthcare market that is truly national in scope.
III.

The Minimum Coverage Provision is Severable from the
Remainder of the Affordable Care Act.
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For all the reasons explained above, the minimum coverage provision is
constitutional. Should this Court conclude that Congress lacked authority to
enact the minimum coverage requirement, however, it should sever that
provision, and the provisions making reference to it, from the ACA. In
deciding to strike down the entire law, the district court made no attempt to
determine which of the hundreds of provisions in the ACA were dependent
on the minimum coverage provision and which could stand alone. Instead
the court essentially threw up its hands, declaring that there are “too many
moving parts in the Act” to “try and dissect out the proper from the
improper.” (Dist. Ct. Op. at 73-74). The district court’s decision to strike
down the entire Act without even considering the relationship between the
minimum coverage provision and the hundreds of other provisions in the law
is flatly contrary to the established standard for determining severability.
To determine whether an unconstitutional provision is severable, the
Supreme Court applies a “well established” test. “Unless it is evident that
the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if
what is left is fully operative as a matter of law.’” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 108 (1976) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3162
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(2010). In making this determination, the Court must determine whether the
remainder of the act is capable of functioning independently. Alaska
Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
There are approximately 450 healthcare reform provisions contained in
the ACA, the overwhelming majority of which can be implemented in the
absence of the minimum coverage provision. Indeed, Amici have already
begun implementing many of these provisions. For instance, in addition to
expanding health coverage, the ACA also makes reforms to health insurance
plans to ensure that individuals do not lose their coverage. California has
enacted legislation implementing the ACA’s ban on denying coverage of
children based on preexisting conditions, as well as a requirement that
insurance plans cover dependent children who are 25 or under. 2010 Cal.
Stat., Ch. 656 and 660. California has also passed legislation that prohibits a
person’s health insurance policyholder from canceling insurance once the
enrollee is covered unless there is a demonstration of fraud or intentional
misrepresentation of material fact. 2010 Cal. Stat., Ch. 658.
The ACA also contains numerous provisions aimed at improving the
quality of healthcare that are independent of the minimum coverage
provision. For instance, Title V of the ACA provides new incentives to
expand the number of primary care providers through scholarships and loan
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repayment programs. Title IV of the ACA requires insurance companies to
offer certain preventive services, and authorizes $15 billion for a new
Prevention and Public Health Fund, which will support initiatives from
smoking cessation to fighting obesity. ACA § 4002. The ACA also
includes $4 billion in funding for two programs—one of which, the Money
Follows Person (MFP) program, was enacted during George W. Bush’s
presidency, and was re-authorized by the ACA—that are aimed at moving
Medicaid beneficiaries out of institutions and into their own homes or other
community settings. ACA § 2403. Recently, the Department of Health and
Human Services announced the first round of grants for the MFP program
totaling $621 million. Since this program was in effect before the ACA was
enacted, it can clearly exist independent of the minimum coverage provision.
The ACA also contains important consumer protections that will assist
Amici in their duty to protect individuals from abusive insurance practices.
In addition to barring the practice of rescinding coverage, ACA § 2717, the
ACA allows consumers to appeal coverage determinations, and establishes
an external review process to examine those decisions. ACA § 2719.
Each of the provisions described above is completely independent of
the minimum coverage provision, as are hundreds of other provisions in the
ACA. These provisions would remain “fully operative” even if the
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minimum coverage provision were to be excised. Accordingly, should this
Court invalidate the minimum coverage provision, it should sever that
provision from the law but leave the vast majority of the ACA intact.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court should be reversed.
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